The enemy in Iraq is not terrorism but political fragmentation.

This summary of a longer paper points out that seemingly intractable internal political divisions stand between the status quo and a peaceful Iraq.  The author argues that the "surge" was counterproductive politically.

The surge has frozen into place the accelerated fragmentation that Iraq underwent in 2006 and 2007 and has created disincentives to bridge central divisions between Iraqi factions. . . .

The reductions in violence in 2007 and 2008 have, in fact, made true political accommodation in Iraq more elusive, contrary to the central theory of the surge.

Rather than advancing Iraq's political transition and facilitating power-sharing deals among Iraq's factions, the surge has produced an oil revenue-fueled, Shia dominated national government with close ties to Iran. This national government has shown few signs of seeking to compromise and share meaningful power with other frustrated political factions. The surge has set up a political house of cards.

The report does not say that political accommodation cannot be achieved without a decisive civil war, but it is pregnant with that possibility after George Bush leaves office. So, as part of his personal exit strategy, the surge was completely successful.

Update on Wednesday, September 10, 2008 at 11:27AM by Skeptic

To the same effect is a memo from one of Gen. David Petraeus' counter-insurgency experts quoted in Bob Woodward's new book The War Within.  This LATimes review of the book summarizes the memo as

"musing that the troop surge has had the opposite effect from the one intended, which was to give the Maliki government a safe space into which it could extend it influence as a national regime.  Instead, the memo argues, the presence of additional U.S. troops has allowed the tribal leaders to assert themselves and their influence not only locally but also on the Baghdad government in an evolving but specifically Iraqi expression of civil society."